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buf fix of password change

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This commit is contained in:
NIIBE Yutaka 2011-05-12 11:04:14 +09:00
parent c196992c76
commit 96de962cfc
6 changed files with 80 additions and 65 deletions
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4
ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
2011-05-12 NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* src/ac.c (verify_user_0): New.
(verify_pso_cds, verify_admin_0): Use verify_user_0.
* src/openpgp.c (cmd_change_password): Use verify_user_0.
* src/random.c (get_salt): Rename from get_random.
(random_bytes_get, random_bytes_free): It's 16-byte.

7
NEWS
View File

@ -16,13 +16,16 @@ At the initialization of the card, Gnuk becomes compatible mode by
setting PW3. Without setting PW3, it becomes "admin-less" mode
by setting PW1.
** Important bug fix.
Gnuk (<= 0.11) has a bug which makes possible for attacker to guess
** Important two bug fixes.
Gnuk (<= 0.11) had a bug which makes possible for attacker to guess
admin password easily. When admin password is not set (the default
value of factory setting), failure of VERIFY doesn't increment error
counter in older versions. Observing no increment of error counter,
attacker could know that admin password is the one of factory setting.
Gnuk (<= 0.11) had a bug which makes possible for attacker to change
user password without knowing original password.
** tool/gnuk_put_binary.py now uses pyscard.
Instead of PyUSB, it uses Python binding of PC/SC. PyUSB version is
still available as tool/gnuk_put_binary_libusb.py.

2
README
View File

@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ Connect your board to USB port of your PC. And invoke gnuk_put_binary.py:
If you use fixed serial number in the file 'GNUK_SERIAL_NUMBER', you can do:
$ EMAIL=<YOUR-EMAIL-ADDRESS> ../tool/gnuk_put_binary.py -s ../GNUK_SERIAL_NUMBER
$ EMAIL=<YOUR-EMAIL-ADDRESS> ../tool/gnuk_put_binary.py -s ../GNUK_SERIAL_NUMBER
Writing serial number
...

101
src/ac.c
View File

@ -56,34 +56,67 @@ ac_reset_other (void)
auth_status &= ~AC_OTHER_AUTHORIZED;
}
/*
* Verify for "Perform Security Operation : Compute Digital Signature"
*/
int
verify_pso_cds (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len)
verify_user_0 (const uint8_t *pw, int buf_len, int pw_len_known,
const uint8_t *ks_pw1)
{
int pw_len;
int r;
uint8_t keystring[KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE];
if (gpg_pw_locked (PW_ERR_PW1))
return 0;
DEBUG_INFO ("verify_pso_cds\r\n");
DEBUG_BYTE (pw_len);
sha1 (pw, pw_len, keystring);
if ((r = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING, BY_USER, keystring)) < 0)
if (ks_pw1 == NULL)
{
pw_len = strlen (OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW1);
if ((pw_len_known >= 0 && pw_len_known != pw_len)
|| buf_len < pw_len
|| strncmp ((const char *)pw, OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW1, pw_len))
goto failure;
else
goto success;
}
else
pw_len = ks_pw1[0];
if ((pw_len_known >= 0 && pw_len_known != pw_len)
|| buf_len < pw_len)
{
failure:
gpg_pw_increment_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
return -1;
}
else if (r == 0)
/* No key is available. Fail even if password can match. */
return -1;
sha1 (pw, pw_len, keystring);
if ((r = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING, BY_USER, keystring))
< 0)
goto failure;
else if (r == 0)
if (memcmp (ks_pw1+1, keystring, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE) != 0)
goto failure;
success:
gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
auth_status |= AC_PSO_CDS_AUTHORIZED;
return 1;
return pw_len;
}
/*
* Verify for "Perform Security Operation : Compute Digital Signature"
*/
int
verify_pso_cds (const uint8_t *pw, int pw_len)
{
const uint8_t *ks_pw1 = gpg_do_read_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1);
int r;
DEBUG_INFO ("verify_pso_cds\r\n");
DEBUG_BYTE (pw_len);
r = verify_user_0 (pw, pw_len, pw_len, ks_pw1);
if (r > 0)
auth_status |= AC_PSO_CDS_AUTHORIZED;
return r;
}
int
@ -196,43 +229,21 @@ verify_admin_0 (const uint8_t *pw, int buf_len, int pw_len_known)
const uint8_t *ks_pw1 = gpg_do_read_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1);
if (ks_pw1 != NULL)
{ /* empty PW3, but PW1 exists */
int r;
uint8_t keystring[KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE];
{ /* empty PW3, but PW1 exists */
int r = verify_user_0 (pw, buf_len, pw_len_known, ks_pw1);
if (gpg_pw_locked (PW_ERR_PW1))
return 0;
if (r > 0)
admin_authorized = BY_USER;
pw_len = ks_pw1[0];
if ((pw_len_known >= 0 && pw_len_known != pw_len)
|| buf_len < pw_len)
{
failure_pw1:
gpg_pw_increment_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
return -1;
}
sha1 (pw, pw_len, keystring);
if ((r = gpg_do_load_prvkey (GPG_KEY_FOR_SIGNING, BY_USER, keystring))
< 0)
goto failure_pw1;
else if (r == 0)
{
if (memcmp (ks_pw1+1, keystring, KEYSTRING_MD_SIZE) != 0)
goto failure_pw1;
}
admin_authorized = BY_USER;
gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
return pw_len;
return r;
}
if (gpg_pw_locked (PW_ERR_PW3))
return 0;
/*
* For the case of empty PW3 (with empty PW1 or no signing key yet),
* pass phrase should be OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3
* For the case of empty PW3 (with empty PW1), pass phrase
* should be OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3
*/
pw_len = strlen (OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW3);
if ((pw_len_known >=0 && pw_len_known != pw_len)
@ -252,9 +263,9 @@ gpg_set_pw3 (const uint8_t *newpw, int newpw_len)
uint32_t random;
ks[0] = newpw_len;
random = get_random ();
random = get_salt ();
memcpy (&ks[1], &random, sizeof (random));
random = get_random ();
random = get_salt ();
memcpy (&ks[5], &random, sizeof (random));
ks[9] = 0x60; /* 65536 iterations */

2
src/openpgp-do.c
View File

@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ gpg_do_write_prvkey (enum kind_of_key kk, const uint8_t *key_data, int key_len,
memcpy (kdi.data, key_data, KEY_CONTENT_LEN);
kdi.check = calc_check32 (key_data, KEY_CONTENT_LEN);
kdi.random = get_random ();
kdi.random = get_salt ();
memcpy (kdi.magic, GNUK_MAGIC, KEY_MAGIC_LEN);
dek = random_bytes_get (); /* 16-byte random bytes */

29
src/openpgp.c
View File

@ -302,24 +302,24 @@ cmd_change_password (void)
if (who == BY_USER) /* PW1 */
{
const uint8_t *pk = gpg_do_read_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1);
const uint8_t *ks_pw1 = gpg_do_read_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1);
if (pk == NULL)
pw_len = verify_user_0 (pw, len, -1, ks_pw1);
if (pw_len < 0)
{
if (len < (int)strlen (OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW1))
{
DEBUG_INFO ("permission denied.\r\n");
GPG_SECURITY_FAILURE ();
return;
}
pw_len = strlen (OPENPGP_CARD_INITIAL_PW1);
newpw = pw + pw_len;
newpw_len = len - pw_len;
DEBUG_INFO ("permission denied.\r\n");
GPG_SECURITY_FAILURE ();
return;
}
else if (pw_len == 0)
{
DEBUG_INFO ("blocked.\r\n");
GPG_SECURITY_AUTH_BLOCKED ();
return;
}
else
{
pw_len = pk[0];
newpw = pw + pw_len;
newpw_len = len - pw_len;
}
@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ cmd_change_password (void)
gpg_do_write_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1, new_ks0, KEYSTRING_SIZE_PW1);
ac_reset_pso_cds ();
ac_reset_other ();
gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
DEBUG_INFO ("Changed DO_KEYSTRING_PW1.\r\n");
GPG_SUCCESS ();
}
@ -377,7 +376,6 @@ cmd_change_password (void)
gpg_do_write_simple (NR_DO_KEYSTRING_PW1, new_ks0, 1);
ac_reset_pso_cds ();
ac_reset_other ();
gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW1);
DEBUG_INFO ("Changed length of DO_KEYSTRING_PW1.\r\n");
GPG_SUCCESS ();
}
@ -385,7 +383,6 @@ cmd_change_password (void)
{
DEBUG_INFO ("done.\r\n");
ac_reset_admin ();
gpg_pw_reset_err_counter (PW_ERR_PW3);
GPG_SUCCESS ();
}
}