GITBOOK-3987: change request with no subject merged in GitBook
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* [macOS MDM](macos-hardening/macos-red-teaming/macos-mdm/README.md)
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* [Enrolling Devices in Other Organisations](macos-hardening/macos-red-teaming/macos-mdm/enrolling-devices-in-other-organisations.md)
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* [macOS Serial Number](macos-hardening/macos-red-teaming/macos-mdm/macos-serial-number.md)
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* [macOS Keychain](macos-hardening/macos-red-teaming/macos-keychain.md)
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* [macOS Useful Commands](macos-hardening/macos-useful-commands.md)
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* [macOS Auto Start Locations](macos-hardening/macos-auto-start-locations.md)
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@ -191,6 +191,14 @@ dsconfigad -show
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More info in [https://its-a-feature.github.io/posts/2018/01/Active-Directory-Discovery-with-a-Mac/](https://its-a-feature.github.io/posts/2018/01/Active-Directory-Discovery-with-a-Mac/)
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## Accessing the Keychain
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The Keychain highly probably contains sensitive information that if accessed withuot generating a prompt could help to move forward a red team exercise:
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{% content-ref url="macos-keychain.md" %}
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[macos-keychain.md](macos-keychain.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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## External Services
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MacOS Red Teaming is different from a regular Windows Red Teaming as usually **MacOS is integrated with several external platforms directly**. A common configuration of MacOS is to access to the computer using **OneLogin synchronised credentials, and accessing several external services** (like github, aws...) via OneLogin:
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145
macos-hardening/macos-red-teaming/macos-keychain.md
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macos-hardening/macos-red-teaming/macos-keychain.md
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# macOS Keychain
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<details>
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<summary><a href="https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/pentesting-cloud-methodology"><strong>☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️</strong></a> -<a href="https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live"><strong>🐦 Twitter 🐦</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ Twitch 🎙️</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
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* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
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* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
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</details>
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## Main Keychains
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* The **User Keychain** (`~/Library/Keychains/login.keycahin-db`), which is used to store **user-specific credentials** like application passwords, internet passwords, user-generated certificates, network passwords, and user-generated public/private keys.
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* The **System Keychain** (`/Library/Keychains/System.keychain`), which stores **system-wide credentials** such as WiFi passwords, system root certificates, system private keys, and system application passwords.
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### Password Keychain Access
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These files, while they do not have inherent protection and can be **downloaded**, are encrypted and require the **user's plaintext password to be decrypted**. A tool like [**Chainbreaker**](https://github.com/n0fate/chainbreaker) could be used for decryption.
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## Keychain Entries Protections
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### ACLs
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Each entry in the keychain is governed by **Access Control Lists (ACLs)** which dictate who can perform various actions on the keychain entry, including:
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* **ACLAuhtorizationExportClear**: Allows the holder to get the clear text of the secret.
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* **ACLAuhtorizationExportWrapped**: Allows the holder to get the clear text encrypted with another provided password.
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* **ACLAuhtorizationAny**: Allows the holder to perform any action.
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The ACLs are further accompanied by a **list of trusted applications** that can perform these actions without prompting. This could be:
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*  **N`il`** (no authorization required, **everyone is trusted**)
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* An **empty** list (**nobody** is trusted)
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* **List** of specific **applications**.
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Also the entry might contain the key **`ACLAuthorizationPartitionID`,** which is use to identify the **teamid, apple,** and **cdhash.**
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* If the **teamid** is specified, then in order to **access the entry** value **withuot** a **prompt** the used application must have the **same teamid**.
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* If the **apple** is specified, then the app needs to be **signed** by **Apple**.
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* If the **cdhash** is indicated, then **app** must have the specific **cdhash**.
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### Creating a Keychain Entry
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When a **new** **entry** is created using **`Keychain Access.app`**, the following rules apply:
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* All apps can encrypt.
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* **No apps** can export/decrypt (without prompting the user).
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* All apps can see the integrity check.
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* No apps can change ACLs.
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* The **partitionID** is set to **`apple`**.
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When an **application creates an entry in the keychain**, the rules are slightly different:
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* All apps can encrypt.
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* Only the **creating application** (or any other apps explicitly added) can export/decrypt (without prompting the user).
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* All apps can see the integrity check.
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* No apps can change the ACLs.
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* The **partitionID** is set to **`teamid:[teamID here]`**.
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## Accessing the Keychain
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### `security`
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```bash
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# Dump all metadata and decrypted secrets (a lot of pop-ups)
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security dump-keychain -a -d
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# Find generic password for the "Slack" account and print the secrets
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security find-generic-password -a "Slack" -g
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# Change the specified entrys PartitionID entry
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security set-generic-password-parition-list -s "test service" -a "test acount" -S
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```
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### APIs
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{% hint style="success" %}
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The **keychain enumeration and dumping** of secrets that **won't generate a prompt** can be done with the tool [**LockSmith**](https://github.com/its-a-feature/LockSmith)
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{% endhint %}
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List and get **info** about each keychain entry:
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* The API **`SecItemCopyMatching`** gives info about each entry and there are some attributes you can set when using it:
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* **`kSecReturnData`**: If true, it will try to decrypt the data (set to false to avoid potential pop-ups)
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* **`kSecReturnRef`**: Get also reference to keychain item (set to true in case later you see you can decrypt without pop-up)
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* **`kSecReturnAttributes`**: Get metadata about entries
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* **`kSecMatchLimit`**: How many results to return
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* **`kSecClass`**: What kind of keychain entry
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Get **ACLs** of each entry:
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* With the API **`SecAccessCopyACLList`** you can get the **ACL for the keychain item**, and it will return a list of ACLs (like `ACLAuhtorizationExportClear` and the others previously mentioned) where each list has:
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* Description
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* **Trusted Application List**. This could be:
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* An app: /Applications/Slack.app
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* A binary: /usr/libexec/airportd
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* A group: group://AirPort
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Export the data:
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* The API **`SecKeychainItemCopyContent`** gets the plaintext
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* The API **`SecItemExport`** exports the keys and certificates but might have to set passwords to export the content encrypted
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And these are the **requirements** to be able to **export a secret without a prompt**:
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* If **1+ trusted** apps listed:
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* Need the appropriate **authorizations** (**`Nil`**, or be **part** of the allowed list of apps in the authorization to access the secret info)
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* Need code signature to match **PartitionID**
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* Need code signature to match that of one **trusted app** (or be a member of the right KeychainAccessGroup)
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* If **all applications trusted**:
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* Need the appropriate **authorizations**
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* Need code signature to match **PartitionID**
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* If **no PartitionID**, then this isn't needed
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{% hint style="danger" %}
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Therefore, if there is **1 application listed**, you need to **inject code in that application**.
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If **apple** is indicated in the **partitionID**, you could access it with **`osascript`** so anything that is trusting all applications with apple in the partitionID. **`Python`** could also be used for this.
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{% endhint %}
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### Two additional attributes
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* **Invisible**: It's a boolean flag to **hide** the entry from the **UI** Keychain app
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* **General**: It's to store **metadata** (so it's NOT ENCRYPTED)
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* Microsoft was storing in plain text all the refresh tokens to access sensitive endpoint.
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## References
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* [**#OBTS v5.0: "Lock Picking the macOS Keychain" - Cody Thomas**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jKE1ZW33JpY)
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<details>
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<summary><a href="https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/pentesting-cloud-methodology"><strong>☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️</strong></a> -<a href="https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live"><strong>🐦 Twitter 🐦</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ Twitch 🎙️</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
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* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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||||
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
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||||
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
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* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
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</details>
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